I. Introduction
In conventional macroeconomic models, price flexibility stabii the economy. If there is a decline in aggregate demand the more quickly prices fall (or inflation decreases), the faster output returns to its fullemployment 1eveL The theoretical basis for this result is well known. The "Keynes effect," for example, implies that falling prices increase the real money supply, reduce interest rates, and stimulate aggregate spending. A second channel through which falling prices may increase aggregate demand is the "Pigou" wealth effect. As prices fall, the public's real outside money balances increase. The rise in wealth increases consumption (Patinkin, 1948) . According to these theories, if prices adjust more quickly in response to output gaps, the economy returns more quickly to long-run equilibritunl
At least since the time of Irving Fisher (1933) , however, some economists have argued that falling prices and declining inflation might not increase aggregate demand. The reasons for this conclusion vary. One line of thinking emphasizes that expected deflation can raise real interest rates, thereby contracting demand?
In such models, the nominal interest rate is determined by asset market equiliirium as in the IS/LM formulation. A negative aggregate demand shock creates expectations of falling prices in the future. This anticipated slowing of future inflation increases current real interest rates and further reduces current aggregate demand. The greater the anticipated response of inflation to demand shocks, i.e., the greater the predicted flexibility of prices, the more destabilizing this "real interest effect" will be.
An alternative tradition, following FEher's original ideas, emphasizes that deflation can reduce aggregate demand if bankruptcy and fmancial distress are costly and nominal debt contracts are widespread.3
In contrast to the real interest rate effect, these models do not work through expectations of future deflation; it is the actual, current price decline that causes the demand contraction. The key idea is that when prices fall below levels anticipated when debts were contracted, debtors' nominal cash flow falls faster than their nominal debt service commitments. Thus, margins of safety for debt payments deteriorate. To avoid the costs of bankruptcy, debtors respond by reducing expenditure. Creditors benefit from the unanticipated gain in the real value of nominal debt, but the increased threat of bankruptcy and the costs associated with it reduce this gain.
Therefore, the risii threat of bankruptcy causes a perceived reduction in net wealth. Increases in creditors' expenditure wiIl not offset the decline in debtors' expenditure, and aggregate demand falls4 Furthermore, systemic factors, such as adverse selection problems in credit markets or a Ylight to quality" that changes the relative price structure of assets, also may reduce expenditure and reinforce the contractionary effects of falling prices5 Following tradition, we call this financial channel through which price ff exibiity affects macroeconomic stability the "debt deflation effect."
Therefore, in spite of the widespread acceptance of an inverse relation between the price level and aggregate demand, the theoretical effect of lower prices on expenditure, and thus the role that price flexibility plays in macroeconomic stability, is ambiguous. The issue must be addressed empirically. In this paper we develop a small dynamic model that incorporates various channels through which aggregate price flexibility affects output. We then simulate the effect of changing the degree of price flexibility for a range of parameters that characterize the U.S. economy. The approach is structural; the various sources of output movements induced by price flexibility can be identified, and their individual impact on the system's stability can be isolatec17
The results of this simulation study provide support for the view that increased price flexibility can increase the output loss arismg from aggregate demand contractions. For some parameter values, the dominant influence is the real interest rate effect. When inflation expectations quickly reflect the future deceleration of inflation caused by a negative demand shock, greater price flexibility increases the real interest rate and magnifies the short-run output loss. However, the strength of this effect depends on a few critical parameter values, which are subject to much uncertainty. We pursue this issue in detail in the analysis that follows. For our benchmark parameter values, the debt deflation effect alone also causes important destabilizing effects, almost completely offsetting the traditional stabilizing channels of price flexibility. For parameter values within a reasonable range of our estimates, however, the impact of the debt deflation effect is substantially reduced.
Nevertheless, the results presented here clearly support the unorthodox claim that added price flexibility can reduce macroeconomic stability.
These results have strong policy implications. For if a decline in aggregate demand causes deflation which further reduces the demand for goods and services, or only negligibly expands it, then the economy has no automatic tendency to return to full employment within a reasonable time period. In this case, expansionary monetary and fatal policies may be necessary.
II. The Simulation Model
This section presents the model we use to estimate the aggregate effects of price flexibility in the contemporary U.S. economy. The model incorporates both stabilizing and potentially destabilizing effects of price flexibility. The parameters are taken from empirical research in the literature except where these estimates are unavailable. In these cases, we use our own estimates of the parameters. The specific point estimates are less important than the rMgc of estimates. In the next secfioq we report simulation results across a wide range of parameter values to examine the robustness of our conclusions and to determine the key structural parameters on which the answer to the question, "Is price flexibility stabilizing?' depends.
The model's structure emphasizes demand-side effects that play the most'important role in transmitting price fkxibiity into expenditure changes. The supply side of the system enters through a Phillips curve equation that causes the inflation rate to fall when real output is below its potential or "natural" level. The supply-side adjustment does not occur instantaneously, however. Persistence in the inflation rate could be explained, for example, by contract models along the lines of Fischer (1977) or Taylor (1979) . The faster the supply side translates an output gap into lower inflation, the greater the system's price flexibility.
The aggregate consumption function follows the general form of the model used by Blinder and Deaton (1985) , modified to incorporate the effect of variables that play a key role in the transmission of price changes to the real economy. The equation is specified as:
where Ct denotes real consumption and pt is real disposable income. Rt is the nominal interest rate, Et-1 Pt?
is the expected inflation rate between the beginning of period I and the beginning of t + 1 based on information known prior to period f. 8 Outside nominal assets are represented by NOAt, Pt is the aggregate price level, and the nominal variable CIPt represents consumers' interest payments obligations.
The lagged consumption term incorporates previous information relevant for current consumption (see HalI, 1978) . From the wide variety of consumption functions they estimate, Blinder and Deaton (1985) fiid that the coefficient on lagged consumption (Al) lies behveen 0.7 and 0.9X9 In our benchmark simulation, we use a value of 0.8 for AI.
8 Some economists argue consumption spending should be a function of the after-tax real interest rate. If we were modify our specification to include taxes on nominal interest rates, the real interest rate effect would be strengthened, biasing the case toward the destabilizing effects of flexible prices.
9 The A1 coefficient range reported here is a transformation of Blinder and Deatons' lagged -mption coefficient to rewnciie our level of consumption specification with the difference in logs used by Blinder and Deaton. The approximation error in using levels versus logs for this coefficient is less than 0.2 percent over our simulation horizon.
of consumers are liquidity constrained, consumption will vary with changes in current disposable income. As, Hall and Mishkin (1982) show, if some consumers spend all of their current income, the term YDt -A1y~t-1 enters the consumption equation. The coefficient& can be interpreted as the fraction of consumers that face binding liquidity constraints. By subtracting the termAIYD&l, the dynamics that would otherwise arise from the autoregressive specScation of consumption are off&t, and the full effect of liquidity constraints on consumption is immediate. Our benchmark value for the parameter AZ, consistent with Hall and Mishkin (1982) , Blinder and Deaton (1985) and others, is0.2..
The real interest rate and real outside asset effects in the consumption equation are important channels through which price fkxibiity may affect the aggregate economy. If output is below its full employment level, inflation will fall relative to money growth and the growth of nominal outside assets. The resulting increase in the real money stock can stimulate consumption through Keynes and Pigou effects. Therefore, the parameters A3 and 4 of central interest for our study.
The effects of real interest rates on consumption are notoriously unstable, depending on the particular specification and the sample period (see the discussion in Blinder and Deaton, 1985) . The standard errors of the estimates are often large, and some authors even find that higher interest rates stimulate consumption (income effects dominate substitution effects). Boskin (1978) estimates among the largest negative interest elasticities of consumption. His estimates imply that A3 in the specification of equation (1) should take on a value of about -11. In some versions of their consumption function, Blinder and Deaton (1975) This kind of effect has not been studied in the empirical consumption literature, although it is important for assessing the role played by price flexibiity in offsetting or magnifying aggregate demand shocks.
To establish a reasonable range for the parameter As, we rely on a liquidity constraint approach. Suppose that liquidity-constrained consumers have a real debt service capacity of DS, which could be related to their disposable income, financial wealth, etc. This debt service capacity will allow them to take on debt up to a level of DS/(i + a) where i is the real interest rate and II is the amortization rate for loans to these consumers.
Assume that these individuals are at a "corner solution" to their optimal consumption problem so they borrow up to their debt capacity. Then, a one dollar increase in the real value of existing consumer interest payment obligations (UP/P) will reduce DS by a dollar, and debt and consumption for these individuals will fall by l/(i +a). To establish a range for the value of As, therefore, we make assumptions about the fraction of consumers that face binding liquidity constraints, the red interest rate, and the amortization rate."
Consistent with the discussion presented above about the effect of disposable income on consumption, we assume that between 15 and 25 percent of consumption is accounted for by individuals who face binding liquidity constraints. l2 Suppose the real interest rate varies between 3 and 5 percent. The remaining parameter lo Including government debt as an 'outside' asset is controvenial. We include it here, h owever, because this assumption increases the quantitative impact of the real balance effect, and therefore makes stabilizing price flexibility more likely. We impose strict 'Ricardian equivalence' later in the paper.
l1 This approach assumes that consumer debt is quickly reduced when liquidityanstrained agents exceed their debt service capacity.
The effect may be more gradual Other facto=, however, tend to cause our approach to undentate the impact of debt deflation on consumption. For example, the level of debt service capacity itself might be reduced in a contraction. and consumption by agents who are not strictly liquidity constrained may also be affected.
'*This fraction of liquidity-constrained consumers is based on estimates of the "excess sensitivity' of consumption to movements in disposable income. Using a more direct approach based on measuring liquid assets across consumer panel data, Zeldes (1989) finds that the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers may be much higher, perhaps exceeding SO percent.
necessary to establish a range for & is the proportion of consumer debt amortized per period. Thii fraction is undoubtedly very small for home mortgages. Amortization averages about 3 percent per year for a 30 year home mortgage. Auto loans have average amortization rates of 20 to 30 percent. Credit card debt has very low minimum amortization, but actual &ortization is probably substantially higher than the minimum level. Given the preponderance of mortgage payments in consumers' debt service, the average amortization rate probably lies between 5 and 20 percent. Calibrating the model to our initial value for consumption, these estimates give a range for the parameter As of -0.6 to -3.1. Our benchmark value is the midpoint of the range, -1.85, but we will consider the effects of varying this value on our simulation results.13 \
To carry out simulations with equation (l), the dynamic evolution of the independent variables must be specified. We assume disposable income is 71.6 percent of GNP, its 1989 value. Nominal outside assets grow at 4 percent a year in our simulations. Real assets, therefore, would be constant at the 4 percent steady-state inflation rate we will assume to prevail in our benchmark simulation. The model determines the other variables endogenously.
Consumer interest payment obligations evolve according to:
(2) log CIPt = DO + DI log CIPt-1 + (l-01) log P,_l + 02 log YDt-1 + &log Rt_1.
This specification assumes that nominal interest payment commitments are determined a quarter in advance of payment. Innovations in these debt service commitments arise from changes in the price level, the nominal interest rate, and real income. We constrain the price parameter so that the long-run elasticity of interest payment obligations with respect to price changes is unity. Because we are aware of no empirical studies of the dynamics of consumer interest payments, we estimated the parameters of equation (2) using data from 1964 through 1987. We use the 3-month Treasury bii interest rate for R, the consumer price index for P, and the sum of consumer interest payments to businesses and implicit household mortgage payments from the Department of Commerce's National Income and Product Accounts to obtain CIP. Our estimates are based on annual data because quarterly data are not avaiIabIe for consumer mortgage payments. The estimated short-
I3
We have found that estimated values of AS from aggregate time-series data can generate larger effects than the range assumed here.
These estimates, however, were not robust to changes of specification and sample period, and they may suffer from simultaneity problems. The empirical effect of debt and debt service on consumption probably needs to be analyzed with micro-level consumption data. We assume that inflation is determined by an augmented Phillips curve process,
where Pit is the actual inflation rate between the beginning of period I and the beginning of period r + 2 and p is the "natural" output rate. The inflation rate is the quarterly consumer price index inflation rate. This is the key supply-side equation in the model, with the parameter H representing the degree of price flexibiity>4 In simulations of the model, once the initial price level is specified, equation (3) determines the evolution of the aggregate price level.
There is a large literature reporting empirical estimates of parameters such as H. Although there is much variation in the reported estimates, Summers (1984, p. 183) reports that "...a middle-of-the-road estimate is that it takes about five point years of GNP gap to reduce the inflation rate by 1 percent..." Accordingly, for our quarterly simulations we set the benchmark price flexibility parameter (H) equal to 0.05.'5 In our simulations, we consider the effect of increasing price flexibility well above this benchmark value.
The empirical strength of the real interest rate effect depends fundamentally on the specification of inflation expectation formation. We initially consider the case in which expectations are formed with perfect 
foresight. That is, we assume that expectations are consistent with the process generating actual inflation from equation (3).16
To test the sensitivity of our results to the expectation formation process, we also study the effects of price flexibility with adaptive expectations:
This kind of inflation expectation equation can be just&d by learning models." Equation (4) would be the optimal forecasting rule if inflation followed a first-order moving average process. Using quarterly consumer price index data from 19741 to 19882, we estimated K to be 058 with a standard error of 022 by fitting a MA 1 process to the quarterly CPI inflation data over this period.
Following Fapari
and Athey (B&7), we specify the investment function as l7 See, for example, Friedman (1979) and Caskey (1985) .
**The Fazzari and Athey specification is estimated from an extensive micro data set. The estimates are also consistent with an aggregate time-series study based on a similar specilication reported in Fazzari (1987) . The expression for the desired capital stock is based on a Cobb-Douglas specification of firm technology. We also considered a CBS specitication in the simulations with the elasticity of substitution varying from zero to the Cobb-Douglas case of unity. The FIP variable is total nominal interest payments by firms. To maintain long-run neutrality, we constrain the price parameter so that the long-run elasticity of fums' interest payments with respect to price changes is unity.
Again, since we are unaware of any empirical studies of the dynamics of firm interest payments andpnly annual interest payments of nonfinancial corporate businesses are reported in the National Income and Product Accounts, we estimated coefficients for equation (7) 
Rt = Go + Gl(MWt)
where R is the 3-month treasury bii interest rate. This form provides some benefits for the simulations.
Because we examine short-run fluctuations following small demand shocks, the linear form gives a fust-order approximation to any functional specitlcation. Also, equation (8) includes the "Prier effect" of expected inflation rates on nominal interest rates in a straight-forward way. This is a key issue here, for if nominal rates fall quickly as inflation expectations decline, the real interest rate effect will not be as strong. real Ml will result in a 0.95 percent decrease in the three-month Treasury bill interest rate. Goldfeld's (1976) money demand study implies an elasticity estimate of -3.95 percent for interest rates with respect to real Ml.
Recent studies by Poole (1988) and Hoffman and Rasche (1989) suggest interest rates are not very elastic with respect to changes in the money stock, which is more in line with the Clarida and Friedman finding. A large "liquidity effect" of money on interest rates is likely to make price flexibility more stabiig because as lower prices increase the real supply of money, interest rates fall more and have a greater stimulative impact on expenditure. Thus, to assure that our simulation results do not understate the importance of this stabilizing channel for price flexibility, we set the benchmark coefficient on real Ml to equal -0.0362, consistent with
Goldfeld's elasticity estimates Since the parameter (;1 is key and there is uncertainty regarding its value, we test the sensitivity of the simulation results to variations from our benchmark value.
Previous estimates of the effect of changes in real GNP on interest rates have also varied. Clarida and Friedman's (1983) estimates indicate that a 1 percent increase in real GNP will result in a 2.2 percent increase in the interest rate. Goldfeld (1976) estimates the elasticity of interest rates with respect to real GNP to be 25.
Research by Poole (1988) and Hoffman and Rasche (1989) would suggest an elasticity of interest rates with respect to real GNP of somewhat less than 2. We set the benchmark coefficient on real GNP at 0.0038 to agree with the Goldfeld's elasticity estimate and consider the effect of changing this parameter on the simulation results.
There have been numerous studies of the effect of changes in inflation expectations on nominal interest rates, with most implying that a one point increase in expected inflation will lead to a 0.7 to 1.2 point increase in nominal interest rates. Authors have explained estimates above 1.0 as the consequence of non-neutral tax laws.
A sample of the recent literature yields the following estimates for G3: Wilcox (1983) This completes the specification of the model. The benchmark simulation equations are summarized in Table 1 . The constant terms are set to equate the initial values to actual 1989 data. We emphasize that the objective of this paper is not to present original estimates of these macro-structural relationships. Rather, these equations provide a benchmark for dynamic simulation parameters. The robustness of the simulation results to substantial changes in the estimated parameters is dkussed extensively in the next section. 
Et_lPIt = Pit
For the adaptive expectation model: 
A. The Simulated Effects of Price Flexibility
Theoretically, price flexibility can be stabilizing or destabilizing, depending on the empirical parameter values in the model. We begin our analysis by simulating the dynamic response of our benchmark model following the negative government spending shock. Table 2 presents the percentage output loss over 10 quarters for different price flexibility parameters. The estimated value of the price flexibility parameter is 0.05. With all three models of price expectation formation, the cumulative output loss would be sinaller. if there were no price&zibiZity ut uZL Tripling the amount of price &xibility relative to the estimated value increases output losses further. This strikiug result runs counter to conventional wisdom. It arises from a combination of the real interest rate effect and the debt deflation effect discussed in previous sections. These effects more than offset the standard stabii channels of lower prices.
Before analyzing these results in detail, it is important to demonstrate that the model can indeed generate stabii price flexibility for some parameter values. Suppose that the debt deflation effects in the 24~ consumption and investment functions are set to zero.
Furthermore, let the coefficient on inflation expectations in the nominal interest rate equation (8) Closer examination of the simulation results clearly shows that the major factor explaining the different results aaoss these specifications is the real interest rate effect. Table 3 gives the nominal interest rates, the actual and expected inflation rates, and the anticipated real interest rates from the simulations with a 0.15 price flexibility parameter, the caSe in which the differences aaoss the models is greatest. In the perfect foresight case, nominal interest rates faii more quickly than in the adaptive case, as one would expect because the output path with perfect foresight expectations is below output with adaptive expectations. The quick deceleration of perfect foresight inflation expectations, however, dominates the fail in the nominal interest rate. The real interest rate is higher with perfect foresight expectations, depressing aggregate demand relative to the adaptive expectations case. It would be wrong, however, to attribute this difference in results to perfect foresight versus adaptive expectations. Rather, it is simply the speed with which inflation expectations fall after a demand shock that determines the magnitude of the real interest rate effect. This point is illustrated by the simulation results with "fast" adaptive inflation expectations presented in Table 2 The increased output loss in this simulation compared to the slow adaptive expectations model is also due to the real interest rate effect.
To separate the impact of the real interest rate effect from the debt deflation effect, Table 4 presents simulations with the cash flow parameters set to zero: In the absence of the debt deflation effect, the real interest rate effect is not strong enough to overcome the standard stabilizing channels for price flexibility of the two adaptive expectations models. Although, even with the slow adaptive expectation model, the real interest rate effect alone eliminates about half the output gains from price flexibiity that arises from the simulation with no destabilizing effects at all. With perfect foresight expectations, the real interest rate effect alone causes destabilizing price flexibility.
Furthermore, the specification of our interest rate equation is even less likely to generate destabilizing price flexibility than the model used by DeLong and Summers (1986b) , or any dynamic IS/LM model with a conventional money demand function. This is because our reduced-form interest rate equation includes a direct "Fisher effect" of expected inflation on nominal interest rates. With our benchmark parameters, a one percentage point reduction in expected inflation causes a 0.8 percentage point reduction in the nominal interest rate. In models that specify financial equilibrium through money demand and supply, the effect of expected inflation on nominal interest rates is indirect, working through shifts in the IS curve. We can study the predidons of this kind of model by setting the expected inflation parameter in the interest rate equation (e) to zero. The results appear in table 5; the debt deflation effects are also set to zero in this simulation to isolate the real interest rate effect. In all models, especially the perfect foresight model analogous to that used by DeLong and Summers (19&b) , additional price flexiiility is strongly destabilizing, even in the absence of debt deflation effects.
C. Debt Deflation Effects
To analyze the contribution of the debt deflation effects separately from the real interest rate effect we set the coefficient on expected inflation in the interest rate equation to unity. As mentioned above, this assumption guarantees that reductions in expected inflation will not increase real interest rates so the real interest rate effect does not operate. These results appear in Table 6 . At our benchmark parameter values, the estimated debt deflation effects are not strong enough on their OYII to make price flexibii destabii
The debt deflation effects alone, however, o&et 40 to 75 percent of the standard stabilizing influence, depending on the price expectations model.21
The consumer cash commitment coefficient (As in equation 1) in the consumption function has a greater impact on the results than the corresponding coefficient in the investment equation (B3). The benchmark value of As is -1.85 but it is the midpoint of a rather large range of plausible estimates. If A 6 reduced in absolute value, the debt deflation effect on consumption becomes weaker and price flexibiity becomes more stabiig. If As is set at -27, well within the reasonable range for A i-O.6 to -3.1) identified above, then the debt deflation effects alone are strong enough make additional price flexibiity destabilizing for all the expectations models. Thus, the debt deflation effect plays an important role in the system's dynamics.
D. Robustness of Results
The results presented to this point suggest that destabilizing price flexibility may be a realistic characteristic of the U.S. economy. The point estimates used in our benchmark simulations, however, are subject to error. Therefore, we analyzed the robustness of the qualitative results concerning price flexibility across a wide range of alternative parameter values.
21 The results across price expectation models would be identical if the elasticity of household and firm cash commitments (CIP and FlP) with respect to the nominal interest rate w-ere zero.
Probably the most signifiwt changes in the results occurred when we changed the parameters in the interest rate equation. The key issue is the liquidity effect," the extent to which changes in real money balances reduces nominal interest rates. As mentioned above, the greater the liquidity efftct, the larger the fall in nominal interest rates when lower inflation increases real balances. Therefore, a smaller liquidity effect should reduce the stabilizing impact of price flexibiity.
The simulations reported in Table 7 c&km this prediction. Our estimated benchmark coefficient on real balances in the interest rate equation (G), derived Erom Goldfeld (1976) , gives a rather large liquidity -effect relative to other estimates found in the literature. The results in Table 7 were generated usin a value of c;l consistent with the money demand study of Clarida and Friedman (1983) . This value is about one fifth the size of the Goldfeld estimate and is consistent with many of the estimates in the literature that show relatively small liquidity effects. In this case, the simulated percentage output loss with slow adaptive expectations rises by 4.84 percent as the price flexibility parameter increases from 0 to 0.15. In the benchmark simulation, the increase was only 1.37 percent (see Table 2 ). The results for the other expectation models are similar. Not surprisingly, the effect of increasing the sensitivity of interest rates to changes in real money balances makes price flexibility more stabilizing. To obtain stabilizing price flexibility in the model with our estimated (fast) adaptive expectation formation, we need almost to double the absolute value of the liquidity effect relative to the already large effect derived from Goldfeld's estimates.z Changes in the consumption function parameters also lead to important insights regarding the qualitative impact of price flexibiity. One of the more interesting changes involves sensitivity of consumption to the after-tax, real interest rate (A). Our benchmark value of4 is large in absolute value compared with much of the literature. Many authors find smaller effects, or even effects with the opposite sign. The results in Table   8 are based on an& coefficient one half the size of the benchmark value, still a sizable effect.
- Table 8 Percentage In this experiment, additional price flexibility is still destabihzing for all our inflation expectation models. But price flexibility is more destabilizing than in the benchmark case (Table 2) for slow adaptive expectations and less destabilizing for perfect foresight expectations
The real.interest rate effect explains these findings. This effect causes real interest rates to rise if expected prices fall quickly. Therefore, the lower the sensitivity of expenditure to real interest rates, the less destabilizing additional price flexibility will be when the real interest rate effect is dominant, as in the perfect foresight case. With slow adaptive expectations, however, real interest rates fall, and a reduced sensitivity of consumption to real interest rates reduces the stabilizing impact of the "Keynes effect." In this case, the debt deflation effect becomes the dominant factor, and price flexibility is destabilizing. In fact, with the lower interest sensitivity of consumption used for Table 8 , the debt deflation effect itself is destabilizing even when the real interest rate effect is inoperative. This experiment shows how subtle the impact of price flexibility on macroeconomic stability can be.
In our benchmark simulations, we assumed that government debt constitutes part of net outside nominal wealth_ This assumption increases the quantitative impact of the "Pigou effect." But it is controversial, under "Ricardian equivalence," agents perceive government debt as a future tax liability and changes in the real value of government debt will not affect consumption. Table 9 presents simulation results in which the Pigou effect applies to the monetary base only, government debt is excluded.
-. These figures are close to the benchmark case. This result occurs in spite of the fact that removing government debt from the nominal outside assets variable reduces the base for the Pigou effect by a factor of about seven and that the Pigou effect coefficient is set rather high. These findings suggest that the Pigou effect is not a very important empirical channel through which price flexibiity affects macro stability.D
The changes in the simulations from varying the parameters of the investment function are largely parallel to the results already discussed for the consumption function. Changes in the investment parameters affect the quantitative results, but the degree to which price flexibility is stabilizing or destabilizing remains quite robust across a wide range of parameters for the investment equation. 
III. Conclusions
At least since the study by Modigliani (1944) , the result that greater price flexibiity stabilizes aggregate output fluctuations has been a central premise of macroeconomic theory. In spite of its theoretical prominence, however, this result has not been subject to much empirical scrutiny. The relative empirical neglect of such an important aspect of theory may be due in part to the fact that the effect of price flexibility on the economfs dynamics cannot be tested through the estimation of a single static equation; the question is fundaqentally dynamic and it depends in complicated ways on the interaction of many behavioral relations.
We have taken a step toward the empirical assessment of the role of price flexibility in promoting aggregate output stability. Our approach allows us to identify the key behavioral parameters and specifications that determine the dynamic effect of price flexiiity.
This insight, however, does not come without cost. The model has a simple form, and we must rely on parameter values that are diEcult to estimate precisely. Thus, the results from any particular simulation should not be emphasized; interesting conclusions emerge from analyzing the price flexibility issue across a wide range of parameters.
Most of our results imply that in the U.S. economy the empirical strength of the destabilizing aspects of price flexibility, the real interest rate and debt deflation effects, more than offsets the conventional stabilizing effects.% We certainly cannot rule out the possibility, however, that price flexibility could be stabilizing, as it is in our model for some parameter values within a reasonable range of our simulation benchmarks. Further research is needed to pin down the key behavioral and institutional parameters and to examine a broader range of specifications.
Our results clearly identify, however, the parameters on which the central questions turn. The speed with which agents adjust inflation expectations downward, and real interest rates upward, following a fall in 24 These results apply to the response of the system after negative demand shocks. Our model does not address the dynamic adjustment of the system following supply shocks. King (1988) argues that the real interest rate effect in DcLong and Summers (l%b) may cause price flexibility to be more stabilizing after a supply shock. We do not pursue this issue here excpt lo note that even if the qualitative effects of price flexibility following a supply shock do not conflict with standard theory, the results we obtain for aggregate demand fluctuations still lead to an important qualification lo conventional wisdom.
output is of central importance. The sensitivity of interest rates to changes in real money balances (the liquidity effect) also plays a central role in dete r-mining the qualitative effect of price flexibiity on macro stability.
We also show that nominal rigidities in debt payment commitments can cause empirically important destabilizing effects from increases in price flexibility. This channel is somewhat more difficult to analyze than the real interest rate effect and the results are less precise because the relevant behavioral parameters have not been thoroughly studied in the literature.
In spite of some of the ambiguities, however, the findings presented here show that the possibility of destabilizing price flexibility not just a theoretical curiosity, nor is it a relic of the Great Depression., It may be a characteristic of today% U.S. economy. More empirical and theoretical research is needed on this topic to provide more definite answers to the questions raised here. If, in fact, a more rapid fall in wages and prices in a demand-induced recession would further depress aggregate demand, or only negligibly expand it, a fundamental revision of the way economists think about macroeconomic adjustment is necessary.
